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Adam Smith’s title notwithstanding, wealth has always remained minor partner to 
income in macroeconomic theory. We all recognize some influence of wealth on 
consumption spending and short term economic performance. Spending decisions are 
based partly on wealth, on permanent rather than current income. But we have not 
explored the link between wealth and long term economic growth.  
 
  This paper links economic growth to the price of capital. Where past work on 
endogenous growth concerns the expansion of the pool of ideas and knowledge, we focus 
instead on the decision process by which these ideas are adopted. The theory is based on 
two hypotheses: that economic growth is an important determinant of the price of capital 
and that the price of capital, in turn, explains the rate of economic growth.  
 
A financial approach to the valuation of capital assets leads to the specification of 
the impact of economic growth on the price of stocks, land and other assets. The second 
hypothesis is based on the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction that pits new 
technologies and new patterns of specialization against the old. Equilibrium is achieved 
between the new and the old through adjustments in the price of capital. When the price 
of capital increases, the profitability of implementing new technology decreases. 
Entrepreneurial activity is directed away from innovation and toward the exploitation of 
more valuable existing wealth. Conversely, a fall in the price stimulates innovation. 
Therefore rational decisions of innovators determine the course of innovation in response 
to the price of existing wealth.  
 
The model explains several puzzling empirical regularities in the succession of 
market upheavals that characterize modern economic history. It shows why asset prices 
are subject to the violent shifts so often attributed to investor irrationality. It explains why 
bubbles and panics are frequently similar in amplitude. It accounts for the apparently 
irreconcilable facts that while brutal changes in the fortunes of investors always precede 
upturns and downturns in the product markets, not all bubbles are followed by an 
expansion and not all panics precede a recession. The theory gives a simple reason for the 
long periods of rapid economic growth miracles and the equally long spells of stagnation 
(lost decades) that often follow these miracles. And it explains why modern economies 
never seem to settle on an average and sustainable long term growth path between these 
two extremes.  
 
  We begin in section 1 with a re-examination of the 13 asset crises that occurred in 
the United States since 1903. We explain the apparent disconnect between these crises and economic fundamentals and the reason why economists fall back on irrationality and 
market failure to explain them. We show that the relationship between wealth and growth 
provides an alternative, simpler explanation of the severity of asset crises. In Section 2, 
we specify the relationship between wealth prices and economic growth. Both the static 
and the dynamic specifications of the model demonstrate that the economy tends to settle 
on one of two alternative stable equilibrium growth paths. Prolonged periods of low, 
sluggish growth, lost decades, follow years of growth miracles. A third equilibrium at the 
average long term growth rate is unstable. The theory of a wealth-growth connection 
opens numerous avenues for future research that we present in conclusion in Section 3.  
 
I.  Economic Fundamentals and Asset Prices 
 
Bubbles and Panics 
 
Bubbles and crashes have always fascinated economists. Though it goes against their 
grain, they have frequently resorted to irrationality and market failures to explain them. 
In his recent review Stephen F. LeRoy notes: “Many contemporary writers are more 




The extreme volatility of asset prices–far greater than product prices- has led most 
observers to conclude that price movements were due to irrationality and market 
imperfections. Economic fundamentals do not seem to change enough to explain the 
erratic behavior of asset prices. The very names of these wild price movements - panics, 
crises, bubbles - suggest irrationality or market failure. 
 
Consider the headline of the business section of the New York Times on October 8, 
2008: “ Forget Logic; Fear Appears to Have Edge.” But, it is not only politicians and 
journalists who ascribe to panic the large drops in asset values that seem to happen so 
frequently. Economists also invoke irrationality and market failure. In the same New 
York Times article, Vikas Barjas quotes two analysts as follows: 
 
“Fear is an immensely powerful force, perhaps more so than greed. Scientists who 
have studied the brain function have found that the amygdala, the part of the brain that 
controls fear, responds faster than the parts of the brain that handle cognitive functions. 
At this point, any spreadsheet analysis of underlying and intrinsic values of stocks 
becomes meaningless, and concern for preserving wealth overrides the desire to grow it 
— what some may call greed.” (Andrew Lo, MIT) 
 
“What’s happening is people are crawling into a bunker and pulling an iron sheet over 
their heads because they think the sky is falling.” (William Ackman, hedge fund 
manager).   
 
                                                 
1 It is not the purpose of this note to review the literature on crashes and bubbles. For an excellent review, 
see LeRoy, 2004.  Mishkin, certainly the top expert on financial crises, defines the phenomenon as “a 
nonlinear disruption to financial markets in which asymmetric information problems 
(adverse selection and moral Hazard) are getting worse so that financial markets are 
unable to efficiently channel funds to economic agents who have the most productive 
investment opportunities.” (2008) A similar view is present in the work of many others, 
such as Bernanke when he explains the severity of the Great Deprecession (1983): 
 
“The basic premise is that, because markets for financial claims are incomplete, 
intermediation between some classes of borrowers and lenders require nontrivial market-
making and information-gathering services” that were disrupted by the 1930-1933 events. 
 
 In the panic of 2008, rationality has been abandoned completely in all explanations 
of the crisis. In Mishkin’s words,  
 
 “The originate-to-distribute model of securitization, unfortunately, created some 
severe incentive problems--or agency problems-- …. problems resulted in lower 
underwriting standards, giving borrowers with weaker financial positions access to larger 
loans than they should have had. Investors in mortgage-backed securities apparently 
ignored the importance of these agency problems and did not adequately understand the 
risk characteristics of the securities they were holding.”  (Mishkin, 2008) 
 
Should we accept these explanations? Should we join in and reject a link between 
investor behavior and economic fundamentals? Or is it possible that the erratic behavior 
of markets and participants has a rational explanation? 
 
Fundamental Determinants of Asset Prices 
 
The wealth of a nation is the value of its real assets, homes, equipment, labor, and 
land. Wealth is subject to large variations over time, not because of its volume, but 
because of its value. Wealth is owned directly by individual economic agents or 
indirectly through ownership of financial assets that provide an agent a claim on physical 
assets. Accordingly, prices of financial assets also vary. In fact, they seem to be even 
more volatile than the prices of physical wealth.  
 
In studying asset prices, economists’ supply and demand framework is useful to study 
the dynamics of price changes while a financial approach is needed to obtain an absolute 
value of the economy’s assets. Adopting a financial approach and assuming certainty 
about the future stream of earnings and infinite lifetimes, we can express the value of 
assets as the sum of present and future net payoffs the latter discounted back to the 
present to reflect the time preference of investors. 
 
                                         P  =    (1 + Π) { (1+C) A + [Σ {A (1+g)
 n / (1+r)
n}] }   
 
                                               = (1 + Π) { (1+C) A + [A / (r – g) ] }      (1) 
 Economic fundamentals enter into this equation in three ways. Economic 
conditions, past and expected, influence the level of the returns (A), their expected long-
term growth, g, and the costs (benefits) of an imminent recession (expansion) c. To 
simplify the formulation, we assume that all of the effects of the next phase of the short 
term business cycle are felt at once and need not be discounted. We further assume that 
the discount rate r is constant. Left unexplained by economic fundamentals is Π, a 
premium or discount reflecting the undervaluation or overvaluation due to irrationality or 
market failure (bubbles or panics).  
 
Because fundamental value is unobservable, the traditional approach to estimate Π 
is to use a proxy for [A / (r - g)]. In stock market studies, for example, A is dividends and 
(1+ Π) can be estimated by studying the historical course of the price-earnings ratio 
(Cochrane, 1991). In home price studies, the proxy is housing rents (Kramer and Wei, 
2004).  
 
Right away we see that speculation and irrationality are difficult to detect empirically 
because Π has precisely the same effect on P as economic fundamentals such as g or c. 
Since the proxy for fundamental value is based on past rather than unknown future 
trends, the analysis tosses changes in long-term and short-term growth expectations into 
Π .  As a result, journalists and politicians (and also economists) all conclude that 
irrationality and market failure are to blame for swings in asset prices. We see bubbles 
and panics everywhere.  
 
Price Movements in Asset Markets 
 
That asset markets are subject to violent swings is beyond doubt. In U.S. stock 
markets, we have gone through as many as 13 “upheavals” or “crashes” since 1903.  
Table 1 summarizes the intensity and timing of these crises.   
 
The performance of residential housing prices is equally remarkable. According 
to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), house prices have 
appreciated at an annual rate of 5.4% on average (68.9% over the seven years from 2001 
to 2007). By January 2009, the average home price in America had fallen by 29% since 
the highs attained in mid 2007. .





                                                 
2 There is no reason to doubt that similar large fluctuations do not also occur in other 
components of a nation’s wealth. The value of human property, impossible to measure 
other than through its returns (wages and salaries), is probably also subject to large-scale 
swings.  
 
3 Similar large fluctuations probably also occur in other components of a nation’s wealth. 
The value of human property, impossible to measure other than through its returns 
(wages and salaries), is probably also subject to large-scale swings.  
  
Table 1: Financial Crises and Economic Cycles 
 
 
a b  c  d 
Financial 
Crises 
Peak to trough 
change in the 
Dow-Jones index 
Duration of crisis, 
months 
Short term situation and 
prospects 
1903 -34%    Recession 
1907 -41%  22  months  from 
1/4/06 to 11/5/07 
 
Recession: Production 
declined by 11% 
1920 -35%    18-month  recession 
1929 -89%  34  months  from 
9/3/29 to  7/7/32 
First phase of the Great 
Depression: Production fell by 
30% 
1937 -41%  12  months  from 
3/10/37 to 3/31/38 
 
Recession of 3.4% within the 
Great Depression 
1940 -20%  9  months  from 
9/12/39 to 6/10/40 
Growth (+4.6%) and 
prosperity 
1962 -23%  6  months  from 
12/31/61 to 6/26/62
Growth (+5%) and prosperity 
1970 -31%  6  months  from 
11/16/69 to 5/26/70
Mild recession (-.3%) 
1973 -46%  24  months  from 
1/8/73 to 12/6/74 
Serious recession starting 10 
months after the start of the 
crash (-2%) 
1987  -27%  24 mo.  Growth (+3.4%) and 
prosperity 
1990 -21%  3  months  from 
7/17/1990 to 
10/11/1990. 
Mild recession (-2%) 
2000 -23%  29  months  from 
5/7/99 to 10/1/01   
Mild recession (-0%) 
2008 -50%  21  months  from 
7/18/07 to 3/5/09  
Severe recession (at least -6%) 
Average -31.7%     
Range 15%-41%     
 
Source: Economagic.com and author’s computations.  
All declines in the Dow Jones average of more than 20% were included except the brief crisis of 1946. There is nothing left to explain 
in that “crisis” since the 25% fall in the stock market reflects almost exactly the 20% fall in output associated with the shift from 
wartime production.  
 
 Crises in asset markets cannot be explained solely by short term business cycles. 
This is shown by the relatively low correlation between movements in stock prices 
(column b) and economic conditions during and shortly after periods of crises (column 
d). Only ten of the thirteen crises were associated with recessions (We alter Paul 
Samuelson’s quip: the stock market predicted 13 of the last 10 recessions), three occurred 
during expansions. Even more telling is the fact that 11 recessions, including the sharp 
downturns of 1957-58 and 1981-82, were not accompanied by stock market crashes. 
Even if all of the cyclical change in GDP were immediately reflected in an equal change 
in stock prices, there would remain a large unexplained residual. 
 
With sudden price decreases of 32%, little of which can be explained by short 
term business cycle fundamentals, the fall back for an explanation is to allege panic 
behavior. It is not surprising that these wild price swings are interpreted as evidence of 
mispricing by imperfect markets, irrational investors, and “greedy”, unregulated 
institutions. But the short business cycle is only one of the potential explanations for 
price movements in capital and other asset markets.  
 
Impact of a short term shock 
 
In this section, we show why an imminent recession, even the severest one, 
cannot explain stock and housing prices “bubbles” and “crashes”. The 34% decline that 
rocks stock markets every 7 or 8 years cannot be attributed to short-term or cyclical 
economic fundamentals. Neither can the “bubbles” that precede these crashes. In fact, 
many of these violent price movements have occurred without a boom or recession in 
sight.  
 
A simple calculation demonstrates that short-term economic fluctuations cannot 
explain more than about one-third of observed overvaluations and undervaluations in the 
asset markets. Let us assume, for example, that a recession is imminent and that all of its 
negative impact will be felt immediately. In this worse-case scenario, earnings fall to zero 
and do not recover until the end of the recession. At the end of the recession, earnings 
return to their long term growth path. The loss in the stream of earnings is shown by the 
shaded area in Figure 1. Clearly this is an overvaluation of the losses occasioned by a 
recession since the “real world” behavior of earnings probably follows a more realistic 
trend such as is shown by the broken line in the figure.  
 
   
 
Figure 1: Impact on the stream of earnings of a cyclical downturn as serious as the Great 
Depression 
 
If the recession lasts n years, the total loss of earnings in the extreme case will 
total n A. Estimating this loss as a percentage of the total stream of earnings yields 
 
c  = n A /  A (1 + r – g) / (r - g)   
 
≈  n (r-g)  
 
Taking a discount rate r of 5% and a rate of growth of earnings of 2.1% (the average U.S. 
long term growth of per capita real GDP), Table 2 simulates the effect of the duration of 
severe recessions on the price of assets.  
 
Years 1  2  3  5  8  10 
dP/P -2.9%  -5.8%  -8.7%  -11.5%  -23.2%  -29% 
 
Table 2: Effect of the Duration of a Severe Recession on Asset Prices 
 
As we said earlier, this is an overestimation of the impact of a recession! Do we 
expect something worse than the Great Depression every time the stock market crashes? 
If even the expectation of a certain and  imminent Great Depression cannot knock off 
more than 29% to the fundamental value of stocks, houses and other assets, no wonder 
that the traditional fall back explanation for all of these crashes is “fear itself”. But there 
is an alternative and far simpler explanation for the catastrophic decline in asset values. 
This explanation does not require that we abandon rationality, the most fundamental 
assumption of the science of economics.  
 
Impact of changes in long-term trends on asset prices    
  
While the long term average per capita growth rate stands at about 2.1%, the 
American economy is rarely on its 2.1% long term growth path. The historical record shows a succession of periods of low-growth followed by periods of high growth. The 
periods differ greatly in length but not in amplitude. The high-growth rates are twice as 
high as the low-growth rates. For example, as shown in Table 3, the average growth rates 
for the last six decades oscillate between high growth (3.8% or 2.6%) and far lower 
growth (1.3% or 1.5%).  
 
  Growth rates  Number of years 
1951-1961 1.3%  10 
1961-1969 3.8%  8 
1969-1983 1.5%  14 
1983-1999 2.6%  16 
1999-2008 1.3%  9 
 2.1%  11.4 
 
Table 3: Alternation of Periods of High and Low Growth in the post-War United States 
 
Changes of this magnitude in the near-term rates of GDP growth are common. 
The onset of the Great Depression probably brought the medium-term expected growth 
rate to 0%. The same thing happened in Russia in 1990 and Argentina in 2001). The 
1970s and early 1980s brought about a break in the medium-term growth rate, bringing it 
down to about 1.4%. The Bush years have similarly cut the growth rate in half, and that 
for a period that has already lasted nine years. Similar breaks in the long term rate of 
growth occur in almost every country. Given the historical record, it is reasonable that the 
investing public expects occasional breaks in the long term growth rate.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the future stream of earnings will be profoundly altered if 
investors perceive a break of ten to twelve years in the normal growth path. For example, 
after a low-growth hiatus as short as 11 years, the economy returns to normal growth at a 
level of earning 20% lower than the high growth economy. Assuming a rate of time 
preference r of 5% in equation (1), an 11-year shift of the rate of growth in earnings g 




 Figure 2: Impact on the stream of earnings of a break in the expected long term rate of 
growth 
 
The figure also shows what happens if the secular rate of growth does not return 
to its normal 2.1% growth rate. Still using equation 1, a permanent decrease of 5 points 
(from 2.1% to 1.6%) in the secular growth rate reduces asset values by another 15%. 
 
Now with only fifty years of reliable economic growth data for countries 
throughout the world, it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively the existence of long 
cycles in long term growth. All we can do is rely on observations of Kondratieff and 
others on the existence of 50 to 60 years cycles. We also note that the Kondratieff cycle is 
consistent with the steady drift in the long term average growth rate in most countries 
since the 1960s, when the ten-year moving average growth rate has fallen from about 3% 
to 2.1%.  
 
Neither the business cycle nor the outlook for the long term rate of growth alone 
can explain the serious crises that rock the financial markets periodically. Each cause, 
acting singly cannot account for more than a 20% decline in asset prices. But the 
simultaneity of these shocks can account for even the most serious of the crises.  
 
It is probably the combination of three expected events that caused the 80% 
decline in stock prices at the start of the great depression: a serious recession, a ten to 
fifteen years period of stagnation and the permanent slowdown in secular growth predicted by many economists, Keynes among others. The 2008 financial crisis appears 
to be another situation in which the three factors are again at work simultaneously. 
Despite being denied for months during the election year of 2008, we knew that a serious 
recession was in the making (NBER finally recognized in October 2008 that the recession 
had started the previous December). It took several years of anemic recovery following 
the 2000 recession to finally convince investors that the New Economy was nothing like 
it had been described in the 1980s and 1990s and that it was time to revise downward 
growth estimates for the next decade and to discard the belief that the secular decline in 
long term growth had ended. A 50% decline in the stock market and a 29% decline in 
housing prices followed shortly after these changes in expectations.  
 
Rationality is restored and so is the idea that markets are efficient. All it takes to 
produce a bubble or a crash is the coincidence of expectations of imminent upturns or 
downturns in three superimposed cycles. The cumulative effect of a serious recession 
followed by ten to twelve years of slow economic growth, and the continued slow and 
steady secular decrease in the long term growth rate could and probably did cause the 
crash of 2008.  Although not synchronous, the three cycles are of different duration. 
Their peaks and troughs can easily coincide. The very conception of a medium or long 
term rate of growth creates a correspondence between the short business cycle and longer 
term trends. The long term rate of growth is an abstraction, the product of a moving 
average of short term rates. It is often a recession or a combination of recessions that 
leads the economy into a longer period of relative stagnation.  
 
Because long term growth rates are not known with certainty, expectations play a 
role here. The “long term growth rate” (in earnings or GDP) is not well defined in 
investors’ minds. The historical record plays a major role. Confronted with constant 
changes in the rates of growth and unable to determine how much of current growth is 
permanent, how much is temporary, we turn to simple thought processes. The current 
growth rate is probably important in our thinking, but it is important in its relationship 
with the historical high and low growth nodes. If the current growth rate is very low 
(below the low-growth equilibrium), we expect that it will probably rise in the near 
future. If, on the other hand, the current growth rate rises above the low-growth 
equilibrium, a large proportion of investors will judge that it will soon decline to its 
normal low-growth path. This will continue as long as the rate of growth is below its long 
term average of 2.1%. When current growth rates rise above their long term average, a 
large number of investors will believe that the economy is settling on its stable high-
growth path. And since we have learned to expect that the economy rarely settles on its 
average long term trend, the 2.1% growth rate is rarely achieved and never expected: the 
economy oscillates between its high and low growth path. Asset prices follow.  
 
 When combined with the short term influence of business cycles, the breaks in 
economic growth can fully explain the wild gyrations in asset markets. If investors expect 
that a slowdown in economic growth will coincide with the onset of a recession, asset 
markets will be marked by panics of the order of 30% or more. If they expect the 




II.  Growth Miracles and Lost Decades 
 
The Effect of Economic Growth on Asset Prices 
 
As shown in equation (1), we have a hyperbolic relationship between the asset 
price-earnings ratio P/A and the long term rate of growth. Let us add the effect of 
expectations. A Gaussian curve summarizes how expectations enter into the valuation of 
capital assets. The larger the difference between the observed long term rate of growth 
and the average, the less likely this growth will continue. When combined, the two 
relationships define a logistic function. The declining probability of unusually high or 
low growth levels produces a well-defined inflection point at the average level of the 
growth-wealth relationship (2.1% growth and a price earnings ratio of 16)
5.  
 
Figure 3: The Wealth-Growth Logistic Curve 
                                                 
4  That economists do not identify these events as “structural breaks” is not surprising. Only one (possibly 
two) structural breaks can be allowed in any time series by current statistical techniques. Hence, studies to 
date have only captured major events such as World War I in Europe and the Great Depression in the 
United States as significant changes in long-term growth rates.  
5 We ignore the possibility that the higher the expected growth rate the higher the rate of discount 
(because of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption). This paper assumes that the rate of time 
preference is constant. Without any further discussion, we assume that sudden and major preference shifts 
are unlikely and should not be taken as determinants of fundamental value. On this point, see  George J. 




Whether the current long term rate is expected to continue depends on investors’ 
mood. Realistically, a higher than normal growth rate cannot persist for very long. Nor 
can an abnormally low growth rate. However, governed by cycles of euphoria and fear, 
investors may easily become over-optimistic at times, over-pessimistic at others. In either 
case, the logistic function becomes steeper at either extremes and asset prices are more 
variable. But the function must always eventually turn flatter at both extremes. In the 
United States in the late 1990s, when expectations became totally unrealistic, the stock 
markets experienced price earnings ratios as high as 40, probably a record. Even then, 
however, there was a limit to euphoria and it was attained in the turbulent weeks of 
December 1999. At the other extreme, the year 1933 brought us to a climax of “fear 
itself”. Yet even then, with a preponderance of investors suffering from utmost 
depression, the market itself did not and could not turn completely irrational: there 
continued to be some buyers and a floor was attained for the prices of assets. 
 
Prices of assets increase with economic growth. At high growth rates, however, 
the objective effect of economic growth is partly offset by the subjective belief that 
growth may not be sustainable. Similarly, at low growth rate, more and more investors 
expect an acceleration in the near future. Accordingly, the shape of the logistic curve is 
governed by the nature of expectations. There are some countries and some environments 
where asset prices are more responsive to the current rate of long term growth. In others, 
the response is weaker and extreme of price earning ratios are rare.  
 
So far this theory is purely one sided. Asset prices respond to economic 
fundamentals, both short and long term. Changes in economic fundamentals are sufficient 
to explain the severity of disturbances in asset markets. The more difficult questions 
remain: How, after a 10 to 12 years break in the normal growth rate, the economy returns 
to its former potential growth path? How long does it take for an investor to incorporate a 
new growth rate in the present value calculation? Are panics and bubbles symmetric in 
length? To answer these questions, we look at the reverse effect of asset prices on 
technical progress. .   
 
Technology Adoption and the “cost of working”: The Impact of Asset Prices on 
Economic Growth 
 
Technological change is in part exogenous, in part endogenous. Exogenous is the 
stock of ideas and new techniques. It is large and increases constantly. In contrast, the 
process by which new technology is adopted is endogenous. At any one time, only part of 
the available stock of new technologies is adopted. 
 
  Schumpeter long ago cautioned us that inventions have little impact on economic 
growth until they are packaged into commercial innovations. New technology appears 
into production and consumption embodied into new products and new methods of 
production. The innovation process is difficult, risky. It is not simply a matter of a single 
entrepreneur with an idea and the resources and the gall to bring it to fruition. Each innovation entails a measure of reorganization and the establishment of new relationships 
between people, products and institutions, new patterns of specialization and 
intermediation. The adoption of new products and techniques is accompanied by greater 
specialization. Each new product, each innovation is one more dimension in the 
organization of production and consumption. Consumers, workers, suppliers, creditors 
and even close competitors must collaborate in the process for innovations to be 
successful.  
 
  Surmounting the difficulties and the risks of new technology adoption requires 
powerful incentives. These incentives must be of a nature to benefit everyone. It is not 
just a question of rewarding entrepreneurs. All experimenters, all risk takers must stand 
to gain if the technology is successful. Incentives originate in the price difference 
between the old and the new.       
 
We define as “cost of working” the relative price of capital. The cost of working is 
measured by the price of accumulated assets (that embody existing technologies and 
specialization patterns) relative to the price of new products. Since existing capital 
embodies existing technology, the cost of working is the price of the old relative to the 
new. It turns out to be one of the important parameters of an economy.  
 
There are two ways to account for the negative relationship between innovation 
and the price of capital. First, innovations require the use of existing capital. Therefore 
innovation entails higher costs if capital is more expensive. As wealth increases in value, 
the profitability of new initiatives decreases. Second, there is an alternative use of 
entrepreneurial resources. Entrepreneurs can earn a profit from the exploitation of 
existing wealth. When the price of capital is high, entrepreneurial resources are more 
inclined to be redirected to imitation and other rent-seeking activities, to the detriment of 
innovation. Rent-seeking, the alternative to innovation, increases in a wealthier 
environment. A high price of capitals slows innovation and economic growth. 
 
  It should come as no surprise to those who have witnessed a serious depression 
that entrepreneurs become more numerous and active when the economy is doing very 
poorly. Though most of us are too young to have witnessed the Great Depression in the 
United States, we have had ample recent opportunities to observe situations just as 
serious in other countries. For example, in Russia and Eastern Europe during a transition 
to capitalism that ruined many, it seemed like everyone was forced to turn to 
entrepreneurial pursuits. Grandmothers used the sidewalks as the site for their tiny-scale 
retail ventures, people of all ages and all occupations became capitalists. 
 
We find in environmental biology a parallel for the relationship between the 
boom-burst cycles of the economy and the technology cycle. Biology posits the existence 
of two types of environments. In environments where specie populations are large and 
safe, individuals enjoy stability and predictability. In low-population environments, 
insecurity is rampant as specie survival is at stake. Where populations are large and well 
established, resources are scarce and it is important to exploit them fully. Competition is 
high, each actor seeking to be well established and strong. Production units are larger, live longer. Market entry is limited. Mobility is minimal. In such environments, behavior 
is more likely to be guided by K-type strategies. In contrast, there are environments 
where the ability to adapt quickly is more important. Consumers and producers are r-
strategists. They are small, nimble, and foot loose. There is little need to compete with 
others because resources are plentiful and relatively unexploited. Because populations are 
small and vulnerable, short run survival is the primary goal. In the economic realm, the 
environment is determined by the price of capital. High prices lead to K-type 
environments in which we tend to focus on competing for the exploitation of high-value 
assets. The reverse is true of r-type environments where prices of assets are low, 
resources are plentiful, and the secret for success is to use these resources to create the 
new.  
 
Although we thus surmise a negative relationship between the price of capital and 
the pace of technical progress, there is little or no information on the precise shape of the 
relationship. The level and elasticity of the innovation function probably depend on 
structural, institutional and historical conditions. There are countries and regions where 
the urge to innovate is strong and can be triggered by relatively small decreases in the 
price of capital. Others, lacking entrepreneurial spirit and initiative, may be more static 
and less prone to change.  
 
Lacking more precise information, we hypothesize a straight line relationship 
between the price of capital and technical progress. The line has negative slope but its 
elasticity varies in different economic environments.  
 
  The Static Model 
 
As shown in Figure 3, we have two hypotheses to explain the pace of technical 
progress and the price of capital. They are essentially demand and supply relationships. D 
is the demand for existing capital for use in developing the new products and techniques 
that will raise the rate of growth. S is the supply, the reservation price of existing assets, 



















        Long-term  growth 
 
Figure 3: The two stable long term growth equilibria 
 
 
There is no originality in the model. All economic cycles are governed by similar 
laws. Some kind of inconsistency or limiting value causes upturns and downturns. In this 
case, a cyclical pattern originates in the inflection point of the supply curve.  
 
We hypothesize that the process of creative destruction is triggered by the low 
price of existing capital embodied in land, labor and structures. The process begins at 
point A when the price of capital has fallen below normal. Since economic growth is also 
below normal, the cost of working will continue to fall for a while, making it cheaper and 
cheaper for entrepreneurs to undertake new projects. Economic growth progressively 
accelerates, reducing the rate of decrease in the price of old assets. The reversal in the 
decline in the value of wealth occurs at point B, the start of phase II. At point B, growth 
has reached its normal level and the period of abundant and cheap wealth ends. Prices of 
wealth begin to rise. But since wealth is still relatively cheap (below normal) growth 
continues to increase for a while. In Phase II, both economic growth and the price of 
wealth increase simultaneously. Phase II ends at point C when the price of capital has 
reached its normal level. Maximum economic growth has been attained. Since growth is 
higher than normal there, the scarcity of capital assets continues to be felt and the price of 
capital continues to rise for a while. In Phase III, existing assets have reached a higher 
than normal price and rent-seeking raises its ugly head. Entrepreneurs shift their effort to competing for existing rents while wealth owners expend resources to defend their 
valuable wealth. Economic growth begins to decline but it remains higher than normal; 
hence the demand for capital continues to be high and asset prices continue to rise. 
Economies experience stagflation, a combination of rising wealth prices and declining 
growth. Asset prices reach their peak when growth falls to its normal level. The upward 
pressure on asset prices ceases at point D. In the final phase of the cycle, growth 
continues to fall because of higher than normal capital prices and the steady reduction in 
economic growth reduces the scarcity of existing wealth until prices fall back to a normal 
level and a new cycle can start. 
 
The model behaves according to the standard Cobweb Theorem. The lag happens 
on the demand side in the slow response of new technological innovations to a change in 
the price of capital. The long term growth rate is rarely at its average level where the 
equilibrium is unstable. Any disturbance tends to push the economy into a cyclical 
pattern of periods of stable high growth and high asset prices followed by periods of  low 
growth and low asset prices. There are “economic miracles” and “lost decades”   
 
The path of equilibrium depends on conditions similar to those of the Cobweb 
model. If demand is inelastic, if the slope of the demand curve for existing capital is 
higher than the steepest portion of the supply curve (at its inflection point), the cycles will 
be dampened and the economy will progressively approach a stable equilibrium at the 
long term average rate of growth. If demand is more elastic, the system will tend toward a 
stable cycle in which the economy oscillates between a high and low rate of growth and a 
high and low price of capital. Any deviation will force the economy back toward these 
two attractors. If the gap between the two rates of growth is large, the cycles will dampen 
until they reach their normal course. If the high growth-low growth difference is very 
small, the cycles will explode for a while until normal oscillations are restored. Finally, 
the greater the elasticity of demand and the lower the elasticity of supply, the greater the 
difference between the high and the low long term growth rates, and the longer the 
periods of high and low growth.  
 
Combined with the standard business cycles, the periodic shifts from growth 
miracles to relative stagnation are sufficient to explain the frequent bubbles and panics in 
property and financial markets. Rationality is restored and so is the idea that markets are 
efficient. All it takes to produce a crash in asset prices is for the expected growth rate to 
fall to its low level. If investors also foresee a serious recession ahead, the crash can take 
major proportions. All it takes to produce a bubble is for the economy to accelerate to its 
high level of long term growth while the economy is in the expansion phase of the 
business cycle.  
 
The Simple Dynamics of Growth Miracles and Lost Decades 
 
We follow the Walrasian-Schumpeterian tradition and assume that entrepreneurs seek 
temporary profits that are eventually whittled away by competition. The number of 
active entrepreneurs E (or the number of innovations) determines the rate of growth. 
The rate of growth is equal to the normal long term pace of innovation diminished by the number of entrepreneurs diverted to rent seeking activities. That number depends 
on the availability of rents and rents are a positive function of the price of capital.  
The simplest linear formulation of these relationships yields the following equation: 
 
      dE/dt  =  E (g  – β P)  or, expressed in rates of growth: 
 
                              gE = (dE/dt)/E  =  g*  – β  P  
 
A linear approximation of the rise in the price of capital assets yields a relationship 
between the change in price and the scarcity of existing assets as measured by the 
difference between the current and the “natural” number of active entrepreneurs.  
 
      dP/dt  = P  δ(E  -  E*), so 
 
                            gP  = (dP/dt)/P = δ E  -  δ E*  
 
Very similar to a linear Phillips curve, this function indicates that there is upward or 
downward pressure on the price of capital when the number of innovating 
entrepreneurs exceeds or falls short of a natural level E* at which the economy would 
grow at its long term average g*.  
 
Recognizing that α = g* and γ = δ E*, the two equations define a Lotka-Volterra 
model in which E is the prey and P the predator (a rise in P turns entrepreneurs into 
rent seekers or, alternatively, reduces the incentive to innovate). The four coefficients 
differ in every country:  α is the normal long term growth rate, β  a measure of the 
ease with which entrepreneurs become rent seekers, δ the response of the price of 
capital to abnormally high or low growth and E* is the number of innovating 
entrepreneurs when the economy grows at its natural rate.  
 
The model closely resembles a theory of economic growth proposed by Goodwin in  
Goodwin showed that variations in the saving rate and capital accumulation could 
result from changes in the share of wages in total income. Wages in turn tended to be 
related the employment rate by a simple Phillips curve. But Goodwin’s model sought 
to explain the accumulation of capital, we focus on the pace of technical progress. 
Much of the work on variations in the saving rate as the determinant of the rate of 
growth was dealt a serious blow by Solow’s seminal article.   
 
The Need for Empirical Work on Cyclical Patterns of Long Term Growth throughout 
the World 
 
If the empirical evidence was limited to the observation that all financial crises 
follow a bubble, the theory would verge on the tautological. For all bubbles must 
burst. But the patterns of economic growth across the world reveal much more. 
Practically all countries experience prolonged periods of high economic growth 
followed by equally long periods of stagnation. And practically all countries have experienced bubbles and crises of varying intensity that coincide with major breaks in 
economic growth. 
 
It has not been our objective in this paper to report on the empirical validity of our 
theory. While there is strong evidence of the presence of cycles in medium term and 
long term rates of growth in all countries these cycles of varying duration and 
intensity are superimposed on each other.  
 
Although much of the empirical work in prior studies of economic growth has 
focused on long term growth averages, there exists a wealth of literature on medium 
term breaks in the rate of growth. Our own preliminary findings confirm that moving 
averages over periods of 5,10, 15, 20 and 25 years behave cyclically. These cycles are 
not synchronized in different countries and are less apparent in the growth rate of the 
world as a whole, suggesting that internal causes are at work. The distribution of 
moving averages do not follow the normal distribution and are often bimodal, 
indicating the presence of high and low nodes.  
 
Even a cursory examination of World Bank economic growth data from 1960 to 2007 
confirms that economic growth in the Post War era has occurred in waves, with 
Europe leading the way immediately after the war, followed by Japan starting in the 
mid sixties, the New Industrial countries in the eighties and early nineties, and the 
emerging economies, particularly India and China, around the turn of the century. 
Other countries including those of Latin America and the United States have 
experienced shorter waves. But, in most cases, the movements in the growth rate have 
been large enough to produce bubbles and crises in asset markets. Most of the 
deviations from the mean growth rates occur in prolonged periods of 10 years or more 
and all of the movements in the growth rate have been large enough to produce 
bubbles and crises in asset markets. For example, using a 12-year moving average of 
annual growth rates, the high and the low growth rates appear to differ from the 
average by slightly more than one standard deviation. This would imply that the high 
growth node is 2 times higher than the average and 4 times higher than the low 




Far more empirical work, and more sophisticated work, will be needed to sort out the 
patterns of economic growth throughout the world. This paper offers a new simple 
framework to explain these variations, one that restores the rightful place of rationality 
and economic fundamentals in understanding panics and crashes. 
 
We are not all rational, of course. But, on the average and as a group, we are. 
Individual rationality and irrationality will determine who will gain and who will lose 
from panics and bubbles. But the system itself cannot be irrational. If it were, it would 
immediately perish. 
 Property markets do not bet on their own demise.  For every panicky seller, there 
is a buyer who will benefit from others’ panic. In the words of Warren Buffett, “Be 
fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.” And as long as 
there is at least one Warren Buffett, the system remains whole. If there were no buyers in 
a panic, the market would disintegrate. That’s the only case in which a crisis becomes an 
upheaval, a cataclysm, a debacle, a deluge, a calamity….  and, while we have heard all of 
these words in every past panic, none of these things happen. Instead, markets get mired 
into long periods of low price-earning ratios and slow growth followed by long periods of 
high growth and asset markets booms. 
 
One of the important conclusions of this analysis is that the 2008 financial crisis 
was not only associated with a serious recession; it also portends at least a decade of 
sluggish growth or near stagnation and perhaps the prolongation of the secular decline in 
the long term growth rate that has occurred since the glorious decades immediately after 
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